AIMS

Index des auteurs > Robert Marc

Le roy Frédéric, Robert Marc, Chiambaretto Paul

This article aims at studying who the best partners to innovate are for small and large firms. Considering the contradicting results of the literature on alliances and product innovation, we study the role of the size of the focal partner on these relationships. Using the French CIS04 database, we study the impact of cooperation with various partners on product innovation for small and large firms. Our results highlight that, for small firms, customers and competitors are the only partners increasing the likelihood of developing product innovation. If public research institutions are not significant, it appears that cooperation with suppliers is actually harmful for small firms. Regarding large firms, customers and public research institutions are the most attractive partners in terms of product innovation potential. The other partners (competitors and suppliers) do not increase or decrease significantly the likelihood of developing product innovation. Our results contribute thus to the emerging literature that emphasizes the specificities of alliances for small and large firms.

Mira Benjamin, Robert Marc, Chiambaretto Paul, Le roy Frédéric

This research studies the impact of various coopetition strategies (horizontal and vertical coopetition) on product commercial performance. Considering the mixed results of the existing literature on coopetition and performance, we shed new light on their contributions by making a distinction between horizontal and vertical coopetition thanks to a change in our level of analysis from the firm to the product level. Building on the coopetition and the bargaining power literatures, we elaborate a theoretical model and several hypotheses. Using a database in the real estate brokerage industry, we show that horizontal coopetition strategies increase the product commercial performance whereas vertical coopetition strategies don’t. In addition, we underline that horizontal coopetition is more beneficial to large firms than to small firms. Finally, we put forward the existence of a learning effect regarding coopetition strategies. In other words, the more firms coopete over time the better they get at extracting value at their own advantage. These results not only contribute to the literature focusing on the performance implications of coopetition strategies but also to the coopetition theory by underlining the bargaining power mechanisms at stake in presence of coopetition.