This article aims at studying who the best partners to innovate are for small and large firms. Considering the contradicting results of the literature on alliances and product innovation, we study the role of the size of the focal partner on these relationships. Using the French CIS04 database, we study the impact of cooperation with various partners on product innovation for small and large firms. Our results highlight that, for small firms, customers and competitors are the only partners increasing the likelihood of developing product innovation. If public research institutions are not significant, it appears that cooperation with suppliers is actually harmful for small firms. Regarding large firms, customers and public research institutions are the most attractive partners in terms of product innovation potential. The other partners (competitors and suppliers) do not increase or decrease significantly the likelihood of developing product innovation. Our results contribute thus to the emerging literature that emphasizes the specificities of alliances for small and large firms.
This research studies the impact of various coopetition strategies (horizontal and vertical coopetition) on product commercial performance. Considering the mixed results of the existing literature on coopetition and performance, we shed new light on their contributions by making a distinction between horizontal and vertical coopetition thanks to a change in our level of analysis from the firm to the product level. Building on the coopetition and the bargaining power literatures, we elaborate a theoretical model and several hypotheses. Using a database in the real estate brokerage industry, we show that horizontal coopetition strategies increase the product commercial performance whereas vertical coopetition strategies don’t. In addition, we underline that horizontal coopetition is more beneficial to large firms than to small firms. Finally, we put forward the existence of a learning effect regarding coopetition strategies. In other words, the more firms coopete over time the better they get at extracting value at their own advantage. These results not only contribute to the literature focusing on the performance implications of coopetition strategies but also to the coopetition theory by underlining the bargaining power mechanisms at stake in presence of coopetition.
This research investigated the role of third party in coopetition strategies. Previous studies have considered that the third party can initiate coopetition and can also stimulate collaboration between coopetitors. In this study, we question this vision by answering the following questions: (a) Is the third party initiating coopetition or suffering from coopetition? (b) Is the third party stimulating collaboration and/or competition between coopetitors? To provide insights on these questions, we investigated two exemplar cases of coopetition in the European telecommunication satellites manufacturing sector. We show that public institutions and private clients can play the role of third party. When the third party is a public institution, it will initiate coopetition and stimulate collaboration between coopetitors. On the contrary, when the third party is a private client, it will suffer from coopetition and stimulate competition between coopetitors. The role of the third party will thus depend on the match between its interests and coopetitors’ interests. If third party’s interests fit with coopetitors’ ones, the third party will stimulate collaboration. If not, the third party will stimulate competition.
This study seeks to provide insights into the principle of “integration of coopetition paradox” considered as a managerial necessity to manage coopetition situations. Coopetition is a relationships filled with tensions related to the coexistence of two contradictory dimensions of cooperation and competition. To manage this situation, individuals need to integrate the coopetive paradox, that means to accept cognitively the paradox and to integrate both contradictory dimensions into their daily activities. The cognitive dimension of the integration principle and its consequences on managerial practices remain under investigated in previous literature. How do individuals perceive the coopetition paradox? What are the consequences of the integration principle on managerial practices? We aim to fill this gap by identifying how individuals are capable of integrating coopetition paradox and how do they deal with it in their daily management. Based on an in-depth study of an exemplar case of intra-firm coopetition we identify for the first time in the coopetitive literature to show and discuss different capacities of integration of the coopetition paradox between managers. According to the integration principle at the individual level, individuals should cognitively accept the coopetition paradox and behave correspondingly to their cognitive perception, emphasizing on both dimensions of cooperation and competition. However, in this study, we show that managerial practices can be disconnected from a cognitive acceptance of the paradox. Moreover, depending on the level of the cognitive integration, we point out that managerial tools are insufficient to efficiently manage coopetition and that all manager are not capable of integrate the paradox and handle coopetition situations.
L’objectif de cette recherche est d'étudier l'impact des stratégies de coopétition sur la performance marché de l'innovation produit. On distingue trois types de coopétition: 1) la coopétition verticale, 2) la coopétition horizontale et 3) la coopétition simultanément horizontale et verticale. Nous étudions l'innovation au niveau des produits et nous analysons sa performance marché. Une recherche empirique est réalisée dans l'industrie des jeux vidéo de l'édition en utilisant une analyse quantitative (régression linéaire) basée sur un échantillon de 190 jeux vidéo sortis entre 2006 et 2011. Les résultats montrent que, pour l'innovation produit radicale, le plus fort impact sur la performance marché provient de la coopétition horizontale et de la coopétition simultanément horizontale. Les résultats montrent que, pour l'innovation incrémentale, le plus fort impact sur la performance marché provient de la coopétition simultanément horizontale et verticale. Enfin, la coopétition verticale semble être la stratégie la moins performante pour l’innovation produit.
