Cet article étudie l'impact des ressources critiques (i.e celles, intangibles et humaines, qui fondent la valeur de l'entreprise) sur la gouvernance (i.e la proportion de points de vente en franchise), ainsi que l'impact conjoint des ressources critiques et de la gouvernance sur la performance des franchiseurs. La théorie de l'agence met l'accent sur les risques de "free-riding" et les coûts associés à la franchise dans un contexte de forts actifs intangibles et humains. La théorie des ressources critiques pointe, au contraire, les faiblesses de la pleine propriété des points de vente, et les avantages de la franchise, dans un tel contexte. Ces cadres théoriques conduisent à développer un jeu d'hypothèses, complémentaires ou contradictoires, qui sont testées sur un échantillon de franchiseurs européens cotés. Les résultats montrent que ces deux cadres théoriques se complètent dans l'explication de la gouvernance et de la performance financière des franchiseurs.
When establishing a new business, entrepreneurs face a variety of contractual forms. Among the choices, they can decide to join a network rather than choose the alternative of independent business ownership. In this study, we analyze what determines whether network membership is observed, using data on the membership status of 20,236 firms located throughout France within the context of the decision to start a new business. The sample is taken from the SINE survey, which provides detailed data about a group of new firms created in France in 2006. Entrepreneurs’ decision to join a network is modeled to include three choices: 1) join a franchise, cooperative or voluntary chain, 2) join a concession network or become a trademark licensing agent or 3) initiate an independently owned business. Franchises, cooperatives, and voluntary chains imply complex and rigid contracts. In contrast, concessions and trademark licences are simpler and more flexible contracts, in which no assistance or specific transfer of know-how is provided. A multinomial logit model is used to model the relationship between the choice to join a network and, on the one hand, the entrepreneurs’ profile and project and, on the other hand, market characteristics. The early results show, as expected, that hypotheses are more often verified when entrepreneurs join rigid partnerships rather than flexible ones in comparison with the choice to start an independent business. If we focus upon the determining of the part of the network’s selection and the part of self-selection by the founder, we cannot derive any conclusion from our results regarding the role played by human capital. However, results suggest that the less financially constrained founders are more likely to join networks that use rigid contractual agreements, which confirms the role played by the network’s selection process in the generation of the pool of entrepreneurs who join networks. We also find that the probability of joining a network that uses rigid contractual agreements increases with the entrepreneurs’ specific industry experience, business contacts, goal to increase income, the project’s amount of financial capital required, the number of customers, and the level of activity competitiveness. In contrast, the probability of joining a network is negatively related to the entrepreneurial circle, the perceived level of innovation and the geographic dispersion.
